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## \*USAF Declass/Release Instructions On File\*

TAB "A"

COMMENTS OF THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, U.S.A.F., ON  
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM NO. 341, "POLITICAL ALIGNMENTS  
AND MAJOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE VULNERABILITIES IN THE  
EVENT OF WAR BEFORE JULY 1951"

1. The Director of Intelligence, U.S.A.F., has reviewed Intelligence Memorandum No. 341 and offers the following comments:

- a. Reference Summary, p. ii, par. 6. Amend as follows: "Communist-led insurgents already are well established in Indochina, which may be brought under complete Communist control . . . " etc., to end of paragraph.
- b. Reference p. 1, par. 1, eighth line. Revise as follows: "~~threat to the security of the USSR~~ achievement of Soviet world objectives;"
- c. Reference p. 2, par. 3, fifth line. Add the following: "non-Soviet peoples to resist in the event of war, and attempt to influence the policies of the non-Soviet governments in a manner that would benefit the Soviet cause or, at least, neutralize the effects of anti-Soviet policies."
- d. Reference p. 2, par. 3, tenth line through 19th line. Revise as follows: "paralyze resistance through sabotage (including ideological and physical sabotage to U.S. policy), labor disturbances, desertion, mutiny, and rebellion. Its particular targets would be industrial labor, the naive elements of the intelligentsia, self-conscious minorities, colonial populations, the armed forces, and (through utilization of the peace campaign) the susceptible elements of the middle-classes middle-income groups, and the policy-making levels of anti-Soviet governments. Sabotage would be directed against military installations, . . . in France and Italy. Penetration of government agencies has been pursued with a view to achieving sabotage of effective anti-Soviet policies. Infiltration of institutions of learning has been carried out for the purpose of perpetuating pro-Soviet feelings among the future citizens."

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e. Reference p. 2, par. 4. Delete from first two sentences as follows: "The Russian people's recent experience of war has given them reason to dread it, ~~despite the ultimate triumph of the USSR.~~ They have been taught, however, to expect attack by the capitalist world, ~~and are prepared to resist such attack.~~"

f. Reference p. 3, par. 5. a., first sentence. Amend to read as follows: "General disillusionment, and resentment and even hatred of the regime, as a result of the exactions, repressions, and personal insecurity characteristics of the Soviet state."

g. Reference p. 3, par. 6, third sentence. Add the following: "If the mechanism of close governmental control were broken, by atomic bombardment for instance, disintegration would set in, but only immediate effective allied follow-up action to accelerate such disintegration and consolidate its effects, could produce positive results of a more permanent nature."

h. Reference p. 3, par. 6, last two lines. Insert underlines as follows: "and if effective Allied support of disaffected groups were immediately at hand."

i. Reference p. 5, par. 8, last sentence. Amend as follows: "On the other side of the scale, Rumania, where Soviet control already <sup>is</sup> virtually complete, and Bulgaria/are least likely to break away from the Soviet yoke until liberation is a fact rather than a hopeful prospect."

j. Reference p. 5, par. 9, second sentence. Revise as follows: "In that extremity, Korean Mongolian nationalism might assert itself, but only under the protection of Allied forces."

k. Reference p. 5, par. 10, unnumbered second sub-paragraph. Revise first two sentences as follows: "Although Mao Tse-tung and his group could not have come to power ~~mainly by their own efforts in a~~ "revolutionary situation" ~~(Not as a result of Soviet military occupation and police control, except in Manchuria).~~ without Soviet military assistance, ~~the~~ the Mao regime has been able, . . ."etc. to end of sentence.

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- l. Reference p. 6, par. 10, tenth line. Delete as follows:

"serious resistance, ~~including resistance from the Chinese Communists,~~"

- m. Reference p. 6, par. 10, unnumbered sub-paragraph four.

Delete from first sentence as follows: "In this event, the actual benefits the USSR would gain from Chinese belligerency might be ~~severely~~ limited . . . " etc.

- n. Reference p. 7, par. 12. Amend first sentence as follows:

"The Tito regime in Yugoslavia occupies an awkward and precarious position ~~as the only Communist regime to reject the role of Satellite and survive~~ as the only Communist regime not presently under the Kremlin's control."

- o. Reference p. 8, par. 12, second line. Amend as follows:

"Yugoslavia Tito is finding it increasingly difficult to exist in isolation between".

- p. Reference p. 8, par. 12, unnumbered sub-paragraph three.

Amend fifth line as follows: "Tito into closer ~~association~~ contact with the West, and there are indications that".

- q. Reference p. 8, par. 12, unnumbered sub-paragraph four.

Delete first sentence and substitute as follows: "~~An outbreak of general hostilities . . . Soviet-Satellite forces.~~ There is insufficient data available to state whether Yugoslavia would remain neutral in the event of an outbreak of general hostilities between the West and the USSR, or whether it would side with either of the major contestants. However, it is believed that the Soviets would make an effort to secure control of the Yugoslav Communist Party prior to, or simultaneously with the outbreak of hostilities."

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s. Reference p. 9, par. 13, unnumbered sub-paragraph three.  
Amend third, fourth and fifth sentences as follows: "~~The USSR, however,~~  
~~holds potentially important leverage in its power to bargain more effec-~~  
~~tively than the West regarding the reunification of Germany.~~ However, the  
USSR through its control of East Germany, can effectively block Western  
efforts to form a Western oriented, united Germany. It can also offer  
access to former German markets in the East, as an inducement to German  
cooperation with the Soviets. Few Germans would wittingly pay the price  
of subservience to the USSR in order to gain these benefits this trade  
benefit."

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u. Reference p. 10, par. 14. Delete second sentence: "~~An open~~  
~~alliance with the West would never be undertaken by Austria as long as~~  
~~the occupation existed.~~"

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